Фридрих Ницше: "Нито Ману, нито Платон, нито Конфуций,
нито юдейските и християнските учители
са се съмнявали в своето право да лъжат.
Те са се съмнявали в съвсем други права...
Казано накратко - всички средства,
с които досега са се опитвали да направят човечеството морално,
са били в основата си неморални!"
Платон vs Аристотел
The Plato's authoritarian idea(l) – of the патерналистическия model of the world!
Oh, that absofreakinlutely платонизъм!
The (justly) ordered общество е онова, ти да видиш, което е being controlled & regulated (managed) by
a (group of) (“enlightened”, “wise”) philosopher-king(s), a ! Баси!
Achieving of този „справедлив и светъл (сошъл, collective) идеал”, lovely Jos,
изисква широко използване на coercion (by the monopoly of властта of philosopher-kings) -
политическо, икономическо & social насилие [и принуда], разбира се,
в името на “protection of the common goodness” of the nation/region/world/Народа!
И реториката (& religion), а не, не, не , lovely Jos,
било подходящият път към (разкриването на) Истината - in reaching the обикновения (масов) човек!
It’s the (absofreakinlutely incoherent опит за) reconciliation, lovely Jos,
of religion and (rational) philosophy,
that absofuckinlutely произвежда the (irrational) ideology of (a degree of or ) ! Баси!
It’s all about the (united) absofreakinlutely bloody , lovely Jos!
It’s (идейно-intellectual линията of) НЕсвободата, egalitarianism!
Още от тези древни (and more primitive) времена, та чак дори и до today(‘s по-по-най- & просперитетен )
it has always been all about (establishing) the scheme, lovely Josephine,
чиято главна цел is to really rob the individual of his freedom(s) & power(s) i.e. to strip down his (private) !
This is (in) the basis, lovely Josephine,
of every collective (държавно funded) institution -
идеята, че a few (corrupt, безочливо нагли, НЕдосегаеми & лукави) психопати-individuals [, who wanna play a , an Elite],
трябва & могат да налагат волята (& идеите) си за да накарат all the rest of individuals to obey them
т.е. to make the individual sacrifice (част от), lovely Jos,
his values, energy, time, desires, talents and efforts to satisfy the Elite’s idea(l)s,
by placing all kinds of limitations on his individual life, liberty, property & pursuit of happiness!
Именно in this way, lovely Josephine,
the majorities (, corruptly управлявани by a tiny, tiny group of philosopher-kings,) absofreakinlutely use their power
to rob the minority (of the productive individuals) of their political & economic freedom,
coercively налагайки of сошъл-economic equality, чрез redistribution of the wealth,
разбира се, в името на “задоволяване of публичния интерес” of the nation/region/world! Баси!
What an absofuckinlutely irrationality!
Plato’s idealism on the dichotomy.
Difference between Plato & Aristotle
Aristotle on vices and virtues, са in fact разлики of kind, not of degree:
Pride, vanity, humility.
seems even from its name to be concerned with great things;
what sort of great things, is the first question we must try to answer.
It makes no difference whether we consider the state of character or the man characterized by it.
Now the man
is thought to be proud who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them;
he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish
The proud man, then,
is the man we have described.
he who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is temperate,
but not proud;
for pride implies greatness,
as beauty implies a goodsized body,
and little people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot be beautiful!
On the other hand,
he who thinks himself worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain;
though not every one who thinks himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of in vain. The man who thinks himself worthy of worthy of less than he is really worthy of is unduly humble, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet smaller. And the man whose deserts are great would seem most unduly humble; for what would he have done if they had been less? The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short.
If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and above all the great things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular. Desert is relative to external goods; and the greatest of these, we should say, is that which we render to the gods, and which people of position most aim at, and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds; and this is honour; that is surely the greatest of external goods. Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the objects with respect to which the proud man is as he should be. And even apart from argument it is with honour that proud men appear to be concerned; for it is honour that they chiefly claim, but in accordance with their deserts. The unduly humble man falls short both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison with the proud man's claims. The vain man goes to excess in comparison with his own merits, but does not exceed the proud man's claims.
Now the proud man,
he deserves most,
must be good in the highest degree;
for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most!
Therefore the truly proud man
must be good.
And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man.
And it would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great? If we consider him point by point we shall see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of honour if he were bad; for honour is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character. It is chiefly with honours and dishonours, then, that the proud man is concerned; and at honours that are great and conferred by good men he will be moderately Pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even less than his own; for there can be no honour that is worthy of perfect virtue, yet he will at any rate accept it since they have nothing greater to bestow on him; but honour from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he deserves, and dishonour too, since in his case it cannot be just. In the first place, then, as has been said, the proud man is concerned with honours; yet he will also bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even towards honour does he bear himself as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honour (at least those who have them wish to get honour by means of them); and for him to whom even honour is a little thing the others must be so too. Hence proud men are thought to be disdainful.
The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride. For men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority in something good is held in greater honour. Hence even such things make men prouder; for they are honoured by some for having them; but in truth the good man alone is to be honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is thought the more worthy of honour. But those who without virtue have such goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of 'proud'; for these things imply perfect virtue. Disdainful and insolent, however, even those who have such goods become. For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others and themselves do what they please. They imitate the proud man without being like him, and this they do where they can; so they do not act virtuously, but they do despise others. For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the many do so at random.
He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because he honours few things; but he will face great dangers, and when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions on which life is not worth having. And he is the sort of man to confer benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the original benefactor besides being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the gainer by the transaction. They seem also to remember any service they have done, but not those they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who has done it, but the proud man wishes to be superior), and to hear of the former with pleasure, of the latter with displeasure; this, it seems, is why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services she had done him, and why the Spartans did not recount their services to the Athenians, but those they had received. It is a mark of the proud man also to ask for nothing or scarcely anything, but to give help readily, and to be dignified towards people who enjoy high position and good fortune, but unassuming towards those of the middle class; for it is a difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former, but easy to be so to the latter, and a lofty bearing over the former is no mark of ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak. Again, it is characteristic of the proud man not to aim at the things commonly held in honour, or the things in which others excel; to be sluggish and to hold back except where great honour or a great work is at stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and notable ones. He must also be open in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one's feelings, i.e. to care less for truth than for what people will think, is a coward's part), and must speak and act openly; for he is free of speech because he is contemptuous, and he is given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar. He must be unable to make his life revolve round another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for nothing to him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of a proud man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is he given to praise; and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even about his enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small matters he is least of all me given to lamentation or the asking of favours; for it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously to behave so with respect to them. He is one who will possess beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that suffices to itself.
Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep voice, and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks nothing great to be excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry and excitement.
Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is unduly humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even these are not thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only mistaken. For the unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he deserves, and to have something bad about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such a reputation, however, seems actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds to its worth, and these people stand back even from noble actions and undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less. Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that manifestly; for, not being worthy of them, they attempt honourable undertakings, and then are found out; and tetadorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such things, and wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public, and speak about them as if they would be honoured for them. But undue humility is more opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.
is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has been said.
Plato irrationally beLIEved, lovely Josephine,
че философите [intellectuals] would be the best rulers of обществото,
защото те могат да разберат (кои са) the real good & the real справедливи неща
по начин, който другите хора не могат.
thought, lovely Josephine,
че нещата (от живота) would be best,
if managed by a Great benevolent dictator - a collective body of ! A ! A god-like body; мистична morality.
И това collective body, ти да видиш, lovely Jos,
knows best [and prescribes] кое е right (& good, & true) и кое не е;
knows best [and prescribes] how & where every human трябва
;knows best [and prescribes] how every human трябва да живее his own life;
knows best [and prescribes] what every human must do and mustn’t!
It is the Great (collective) (ise)! A version of a ! Баси!
God knows best! Затова Той трябва да управлява – the ppl [in a nation/region/world]!
Yes, Plato thought,
че такава social organization would be in the best interest - of the (common) ppl! Баси!
И много БГ политици, много прости БГ хора, и много , lovely Jos,
more or less,
без (дори) да знаят какво е мислил Платон или Аристотел,
мислят същото и днес (през 21 век) дори [, не знаейки или forgetting the history of 19-th & 20-th centuries]!
Yes, мнозинството, lovely Jos,
по един или друг начин,
всъщност (UNconsciously) мисли (все още) по този irrational (Plato’s line) way! Баси!
Интелектуалният наследник на the Plato линията,
в the modern философия,
e the german philosopher Immanuel [1724 –1804, Прусия].
Oh, that Kant – пълен е със "";
да, lovely Jos, Ницше го нарича
личност, отровена от богословска кръв…
Част от the Plato’s line:
The philosophical background of the класическа German (anti-freedom) философия – Светата троица ---ism.
Част от the Plato’s line:
The Aristotle’s line:
Adam Smith, Frédéric Bastiat, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson,
John Stuart Mill, Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek,
Milton Freedman, Маргарет Тачър, etc.
човек, lovely Jos,
no matter дали го (о)съзнава или не,
-in broad terms-
or Platonic (operative) (ogy) of thinking [i.e. views of the world]!
ти си Platonist or Aristotelian в & си!
Ти си either an irrationalist or a truly rational woman!